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Most  policy  decisions  about  targets  and  instruments  of pollution
control  should  probably  be made at the highest  level of govern-
ment involved.  But effective  implementation  - including in-
spection,  enforcement,  and prosecution  - may  require involv-
ing all levels of government.  Coordination  is then necessary,
with substantive  implications  for choices  of policy  tools and  the
assignment  of responsibilities.
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Traditional  approaches to pollution control  *  Coordination of government policies-
emphasize the "government's"  role in providing  between levels of government (vertical coordina-
incentives to alter the behavior of relevant  tion) or between administrative bodies in the
economic agents. But to exploit cost advantages  same tier (horizontal) - may be improved by
at different levels of government, pollution  using intergovernmental incentive schemes.
control policies typically involve assigning a
variety of responsibilities to different public  *  One device is to grant the local government
agencies.  financial autonomy, in the sense that any taxes or
fines it collects from enforcement are retained
These responsibilities can include choosing  locally. There are substantive implications in the
policy targets, controlling instruments, and  choice of control instrument. For example, if
developing and implementing strategies for  local govemments maximize revenue and an
monitoring and enforcement.  - .ission tax is used, firms with high costs of
abatement could be forced to bear most of the
A hierarchically decentralized management  cost of reducing emissions. It may be more
structure introduces problems of coordination  efficient for the local government to enforce a
because different agencies may have different  standard,  because then most abatement is carried
objectives. These problems can be alleviated-  out by low-cost abaters.
and the efficiency gains from decentralized
control retained - by modifying  *  A more subtle incentive is to explicitly
intergovernmental relations, particularly by  affect the enforcement budget of a local regula-
using implicit and explicit financial transfers and  tor. By controlling the size of the budget through
by dividing initial property rights equally among  lump-sum transfers, and indirectly through fine
local authorities to ensure that they will all want  rebates, the central government can modify the
to participate in the negotiating process Jack  inspection activities of a local regulatory agency
describes in this paper. Among Jack's  conclu-  in a way that improves welfare.
sions:
Under decentralized control, command and
No single level of government should be  control policies may be implemented more
responsible for all environmental policy. Policy  efficiently than market-based instruments. And
decisions about targets and instruments should  uniform national or regional standards may
be based on the most complete and accurate data  improve the efficiency of interjurisdictional
available and should encompass all aspects of  negotiations.
the problem. i3ut effective implementation -
including inspection, enforcement, and prosecu-
tion - may require involving all levels of
government.
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paper is part of CECPE's work program on evaluating economic policy instruments for pollution
control, funded by RPO 676-48.Traditional  approaches  to pollution  control emphasize  the role of "the government"  in
providing  appropriate  incentives  to alter the behavior  of the relevant  economic  agents. The choice
of control  strategy,  for instance  economic  instruments  versus  regulation,  is usually  analyzed  within  a
simple  regulatory  structure,  involving  the government  and the polluting  and/or  polluted  agents.
The choice  is  determined,  inter alia,  by the objectives  of the govermnent,  the nature and
accuracy  of  information,  the  enforceability  of  policies,  political feasibility,  and financial and
institutional  constraints.' Some  of these factors  can  be especirIly  important  in developing  countries,
where  information  and monitoring  systems  are weak,  and public  finances  often severely  constrained.
The strength of the constraints  frustrating  effective  environmental  policy  design may,
however,  depend  on the government  body  involved.  Different  levels  of government  can  be expected
to fulfill  the various  requirements  of an overall  control  mechanism  at different  costs. Based  on this
observation, an  optimal pollution control policy will consist of  a  particular assignment  of
responsibilities  across  government  agencies,  minimizing  the total associated  costs. This assignment
choice  may  be stated simply  as:
(i)  who  sets enviromnental  objectives  and targets?;
(ii)  who  chooses  the instruments  (e.g.taxes,  quotas)?;  and
(iii)  who  implements  the control  strategy?
The solution  to this assignment  problem  will  clearly  depend  upon the country  and pollution  problem.
Nonetheless,  if all goverment  agencies  pursue the same objectives,  the solution is in theory,
straightforward:  each function  should  be assigned  to the agency  with  a comparative  advantage  in that
area.
'See Eskeland  and Jimenez  (1991),  for a review  of the instrmment  choice  problem  in developing
countries.-2-
This last assumption, however, is unlikely to be fulfilled. In general, when government
agencies have different  objectives, any diversified assignment of  responsibilities will introduce
additional constraints. These incentive constraints, resulting from the need to explicitly  coordinate
the actions of the different government agencies involved,  can be significant.
One  solution to  this problem is to  recentralize the  control strategy.  With a  single
goverment  agency making all relevant decisions  no inter-governmental  coordination problems arise.
However such a concentration of responsibilities,  while  avoiding  the incentive costs, can result in high
information and transaction costs.
A preferable  approach  is to  search for  alternative means by  which the  actions of
government agencies can be coordinated.  For instance, if conditional inter-govermental  transfers
are possible, incentives at lower levels can be suitably modified.  More generally, by modifying  the
interactions of government agencies, policy coordination can be  improved.  This paper aims to
identify the  important features of inter-governmental and government-polluter relationships, their
influences on  the  choice of  control strategy, and ways in which they can be modified to  yield
improved policy performance.
The next section describes the assignment  problem in detail. Section 3 addresses vertical
co-ordinatior - that is, meC  -2:~Nms  by which the actions of government agencies at different levels
can be coordinated. Particui.- £ttention is given to the problem of inducing efficient monitoring and
enforcement of national policies at the local level.
Section 4  considers the  coordination of horizontally related  agencies.  The primary
concern is with inter-jurisdictional externalities, and the coordination of local municipal policies:
should local governments be  allowed to  set  their own emission control policies, or  are uniform
national  standards  preferred?.  At  the  central  government  level, the  horizontal  problem  of
inter-ministerial  coordination is also considered. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions  and general
lessons for the design of pollution control policies.2.  THE ASSIGNMENT  PROBLEM
We have suggested that an effective environmental policy may require the assignment of
a number of responsibilities  to different levels  of government. In this section we  present a conceptual
framework within wh.ch to think about the following  questions:
(i)  What is to be assigned?;  and
(ii) How should the assignment choice be formulated operationally?
These issues will be considered in the following  two sub-sections  It will be seen that an important
factor is the coordination of the actions of different government bodies, and that the assignment of
responsibilities  should not be made without explicitly  accounting for possible coordination failures.
The inclusion of such problems in the decision process may  lead to either a change in the assignment
- for  instance,  favoring  quantity  controls  ahead  of  price  mechanisms  --  a  modification  of
inter-governmental relations -- such as forcing local monitoring agencies to finance a part of their
enforcement  budgets  -- or both.
1a)  What is to be assigned?
There  are  three  types  of  choices which must  be  allocated  to  particular  levels of
government in the assignment problem. These may be categorized as:
(a) the choice of objectives;
(b) the choice of control instrument; and
(c) the choice of implementation strategy.
(a)  In an operational sense, the choice of the  objectives of environmental policy will be
manifest in the choice of desired ambient environmental quality and associated emission reduction
targets.  The choice of objective is based on the costs and benefits of emission control weighted- 4 -
arpropriately. 2 The assignment problem is then one of allocating the responsibility for decisions
about these objectives.
(b)  Once objectives  have been set, a suitable control instrument must be chosen.  There are
two components of such a choice: tirst the qualitative nature of the control device - should emission
quotas, pollution taxes, tradable permits, or some combination be used to  modify the actions of
polluters?; and second, the strength of the control instrument employed - how high should fines or
taxes be.
(c)  Finally,  having decided upon an instrument of control and a target, the responsibility  for
implementing  the policy rnust be allocated to a certain government body. These responsibilities  will
include inspections of firms, monitoring of ambient quality, enforcement of laws and collection of
taxes. The efficiency  with which these functions are performed by different levels  of government help
determine the appropriate assignment.
(ii)  Formulating the assignment choice
Different assignments  of the responsibilities  in (a)-(c) above will  contribute differently to
overall potential and realized costs and benefits of environmental policy. The assignment problem
is then one of choosing the allocation of responsibilities  which yields  the largest net increase in social
benefits.
(a)  To  ensure maximal potential net increases in social benefits the  agency which makes
decisions about environmental objectives must be aware of all the possible benefits and costs of
reduced emissions. This knowledge  has two aspects: the qualitative nature of benefits and costs, and
their quantitative significance.
'Me  weights are derived from the social welfare function used by the  decision maker.  For
instance, if a local government chooses emission reduction targets which have external effects on
other jurisdictions, these oenefits may receive low welfare weights.-5 -
R might be expected  that higher level government  bodies are in a better position to
include  all  types  of direct  and indirect  benefits  and costs  (e.g. impacts  on 1health,  biodiversity,  tourism,
employment,  tecbology,  etc.) in their  analysis,  but that lower level agencies have a  better
understanding  of the quantitative  significance  of any given factor, due to better on-the-ground
information. However,  this assertion is unlikely  to be universally  correct:  due to communication
barriers central governments  may fail to  include the effects of a national policy  on some local
communities;'  on the other hand, officials  on village  councils  are unlikely  to have access  to data
about the long-term  impact  of global  warming.  Clearly,  the nature of the pollution  problem  affects
the assignment  of responsibility  for setting  objectives.
Another important  factor  is  the political  economy  of the decision  making  process. It may
be that a particular  government  body is in the best position  to calculate  the total net social  benefits
associated  with improvements  in ambient  quality. However,  if the political  process is open to
lobbying  by  influential  minority  groups  and/or  corruption,  then  the resulting  environmental  policy  may
be too weak  (if polluters  lobby  effectively)  or too severe  (if zealous  environmentalists  do so). A les-
than perfecdy informed,  but representative,  government  may  be preferable  to  a fully informed,
corruptible  one.
(b)  In deciding  upon the type  and  strength  of a control  instrument,  a government  agency  must
consider the economic  efficiency  of the instrument  and revenue effects. Weitzman  (1974) has
considered  the efficiency  properties  of quantity  based  instruments  (i.e. command  and control  policies,
or CACs)  and  price  mechanisms  (market  based  instruments,  or MBIs)  under  conditions  of uncertainty
'Alternatively,  the central  government  may  be aware  of the effects,  but put zero weight  on them.
'he  existing  distribution  of income  and political  power  are important  in this respect,  for instance  in
Nepal,  where "little  has been done to solve  the [environmental]  problems  of the poor, because  they
represent  the weaker  sections  of society  and lack  the ability  to attract  political  attention  and  financial
resources."  (Asia Development  Bank (1990)).-6  -
about costs and/or benefits of pollution controi.  Under certain conditions pertainir,g to the relative
curvatures of the cost and benefit functions, a quantity standard is more efficient than a tax. 4 The
government body which has more accurate knowledge  of these functions should then be responsible
for choosing the control instrument.
On the other hand, many developing country governments are revenue constrained,  so
any generation of public funds as a by-product  of pollution control is welcome. Since most revenue
sources are uistortionary, the use of a corrective tax not only increases public funds, but can reduce
dead-weight loss in the economy as well.  This has implications for part  (b) of the  assignment
problem: for example, if the tax base of local government is highly elastic and that of the central
government is inelastic, the local government should be given access to the new source of revenue,
since by reducing other  local taxes it can remove more distortionary loss than can the  central
government. The relative efficiency  of local versus central tax collection will  be determined by, inter
alia,  the geographical mobility  of the tax base, administrative  capacities, and cultural norms. These
are clearly empirical matters, and can be expected to vary between countries.
If a lower level of government is assured of sufficiently  large grants from higher levels,
it may opt  for  a  low emission tax or  light fines which are  incapable of  attaining the desired
environmental improvement. On the other hand, if local governments are fiscally  constrained with
little help from the  center, tax rates might be set  above their optimal level.  Thus the existing
structure of inter-governmental financial relations is an important factor in the assignment problem.
(c)  The implementation of pollution control policies may  require the involvement  of a number
of levels of government. When polluters are hard to detect, a local monitoring agency may be more
efficient than a national body.  Estache (1991) reports that  in Brazil, due to the small number of
inspectors, it can be weeks before the state enforcement agency sanctions illegal logging activities.
'See Eskeland and Jimenez (1991) for an explanation of this result.-7  -
Local municipal enforcement may have been achieved in a much shorter time, with avoidance of
adherent  wosts. On the other hand, inspections by a local agency may become predictable, while
those of a central body, may be less predictable, and hence more effective. The relative degree of
corruptibility of local and central government officials will clearly be  important in this respect. 5
Analogous problems have been recognized in the case of Malaysian  urban water supply by the Asia
Development Bank (1990), which recommends,
"[mleasures to improve the  efficiency of governmental institutions and organizational
structures in order to  bring about a more concerted respe,ise to  wastewater pollution
problems...  "
A further institutional constraint on enforcement is credibility. While local agencies may
be most capable of identifying  offenders, eliciting taxes or fines may be a protracted process.  For
example,  the Korean Ministry of Environment is handicapped in the enforcement of laws regarding
pollution discharges, due to  lack of judicial power, which hinders access to  plants suspected of
violations. 6 If  the government cannot commit to  full enforcement, it may have to  establish a
reputation by undertaking long and costly  legal battles.  Local governments especially  may not be in
a position to engage in such long term strategic behavior (incurring high costs now so as to lessen
future enforcement costs).
(iii)  Intergovernmental incentives
Within a diversified control structure, there  is a need to coordinate the actions of all
relevant parties.  This has been explicitly  recognized in the case of water pollution in Malaysia,  for
example, where
5Ralston, Anderson and  Colson (1983) present some evidence on the accountability of local
officials.
6Asia Development Bank (1990).- 8-
"..:t  seems certain that the problem can be solved  only by joint participation
of the federai, state, and local authorities. ... Thus to deai effectively with a
widely  recognized environmental problem will require institutional changes
and new governmental relations." 7
Government coordination is necessary for two rea,ons:  each  agency needs to  know what  it is
supposed to  do, and  it must have an  incentive to  do  it.  The  first  requires sufficiently clear
communication  channels be,,eeen government bodies.  The second is problematic if the objectives
of different agencies differ and, because of information  problems, comprehensive  inter-governmental
contracts cannot be written.
Divergent objectives  c'an  be interpreted as deriving  from the objectives  of elected officials
acting  in  the  interests  of  their  constituents. 8 When jurisdictions are  distinct (e.g.  two  local
authorities) or intersect ( e.g. local and national bodies), the relevant constituents differ.  If the
objectives  of each government body are dete-iuned  by those of the median voter, for example,  then
they will in general diverge.
These divergences may  be conveniently  classified  as vertical and horizontal, impeding  the
coordination of agencies in different tiers of government, and within the same tier, respectively.
Vertical divergences create policy coordination problems when;
(i)  local emissions  affect state or national ambient quality. This fact may explain the observed
superiority of the Dutch system of water pollution control (under the "Act on Pollution of Surface
Water") over that of France.  In France, regional bodies set and collect charges on polluting frmns
which are then distributed to local authorities to finance clean-up activities. However, according to
Jansen (1991);
7ibid.
'f  course, the assumption  of such benevolence is questionable. Not all governments are elected,
and in any case, internal and external political pressures can lead to policies not in the true public
interest.-9-
"it seems  that the financial  incentive  to the French mayors  is too low  to elicit
strong  enough reaction."
In the Netherlands,  the responsibility  for clean-up  rests with the regional  authorities.
(ii)  locally  polluting  firms  are owned  by non-local  residents;
(iii)  the central  governm.ent  is more  responsive  to international  conceris. The case  of Brazil  is
an obvious  example. Alternatively,  the international  pressure  may  be indirect,  as in Eastern Europe
and the Mediterranean,  where;
"...most  countries in the  reg:on aspire to  one  or  another form of
assr,ciation  the [European)  Community,  and hence wish  to demonstrate
their  status as  good Europeans by  adopting environmental  policies
consistent  with  those of the Community.";90r
(iv)  other budgetary  responsibilities  are ignored. For instance  when health care is funded
locally,  if pollution  control  policies  are formulated  nationally.  they  must account  for the full impact
of ill health on the local  budget.
Divergent  objectives  within a single  tier of government  will mean that some form of
caordination  is necessary  to alleviate  external  effects  such as
(i)  transboundary  pollution. Horizontal  coordination  may  be preferable  to central
control,  as has been recognized  in Indonesia,  where
"[in orderi  to make maximum  use of existing  personnel  and other resources  and
to avoid  establishing  new  agencies  of uncertair capability,  it would  seem  advisable
to  consider seriously the  establishment  of  a  pollution control or  water
management  board, which would bring together the  talents of  all existing
agencies....  Such coordinating  bodies  have  proved to be more effective  in other
countries  than the creation  of independent  new agencies.";` 0 and
'Weiss (1991).
'°Asia  Development  Bank (1990).- 10-
(ii)  non-environmental external effects, such as cost exporting and tax competition
between states."
At higher levels of government, horizontal policy coordination is likely to be required
when different ministries  and departments have inconsistent mandates. For example, an Environment
Department may insist on high prices to help attain reductions in electricity  use and hence reductions
in emissions  from generating plants. However, a Consumer Affairs Department may  wish  to enforce
low prices to alleviate monopoly distortions.  lhe  optimal policy would appear to be one of high
prices and a tax on profits, but if this is infeasible,  the two departments must coordinate their actions
accordingly.
The  implied coordir..ation problems  identified above may necessitate  a  change  in
inter-governmental relations and/or a modification  of the assignment  of responsibilities. This process
is shown schematically  in Figure 1 below. In the following  two sections we examine specific examples
of such changes and modifications.
Define Inter-  Assign  Are there  No  /




"Whether local governments set emission  taxes and standards at inappropriate levels to attract
investment and increase employment is debatable.  For relevant contributions to this debate, see
Estache end Taylor (1991b), and Oates and Schwabb  (1988).- 11 -
3.  VERTICAL COORDINATION
In this section some stylized versions  of vertical control structures will  be considered. We
concentrate on the delegation of monitoring and enforcement responsibility  to  local governments,
with policy set by the center.  Three general conclusions  are drawn from the analysis:
(i)  the need to induce local monitoring and enforcement activities  may have implications
for the choice of optimal control instrument (e.g. price or quantity instrument);
(ii)  for  a  given instrument  choice, the  retention  of  some  control  over  the  local
government's  enforcement  budget  can  effectively induce  more  efficient  local
monitoring policies; and
(iii)  monitoring and enforce can be controlled more efficiently if additional (related)
variables help determine inter-governmental transfers.
(i)  Incentive schemes
WVhen  a pollution control policy  is designed and implemented  through a vertical  regulatory
structure, the incentives of each level of the hierarchy must be taken into account.  An important
vertical division  of responsibilities  is that between policy  choice on the one hand, and monitoring and
enforcement on the other.
In addition, local governments  are usually  permitted to raise their environmental standards
above those mandated by the center" 2. However, we will  concentrate mostly on the monitoring and
enforcement issue, relying  on the obse3rvation  that in developing countries, national regulations are
usually binding (in the sense that local pollution control policies rarely require more abatement than
the national law, if one exists' 3).
"...although this is not always  in the national interest.  See Estache and Taylor (1991b), and also
Hoel (1991) for an example in an international context.
'3Estache and Taylor (1991a).- 12 -
Note  that  we are not  confining ourselves to  the monitoring and  enforcement of an
ambient or emission standard only. Environmental taxes have to be collected if they are to have any
behavioral effect.  Similarly,  if tradable permits are used, emission levels must comply with permit
holdings.
We shall treat the inter-governmental problem within the principal-agent paradigm (see
Box 1). In general, theoretical solutions to principal-agent  problems exhibit complex properties, with
optimal payments schedules often non-linear and sensitive to  parameters.  On the  other hand,
practical transfer or financing mechanisms should be transparent.  For example, one of the reasons
cited for the success  of the Dutch environmental funding policies (GEPA and APSW) has been their
ease of administration and the transparency of their rationale and effects.' 4
The outcomes sought at the  local level must be feasible, and are determined by the
availability  of local resources.  The central government can expand the set of feasible outcomes by
the use of grants, training programs, and political support.  However, the  incentive problem will
persist, and without proper motivation for efficient use, the resources may be wasted.
Inter-governmental incentive schemes can vary widely  in sophistication. The selection of
schemes will  be based on their effectiveness,  the institutional capacity  of both government agencies,
the need for stable fiscal relations, and their political feasibility. The schemes we consider include:
(i)  those  without an  explicit financial transfer, but  granting the  local government
additional revenue sources (e.g., allowing  the local government to retain any taxes
or fines collected in the enforcement of federally set policies);
(ii)  those with simple transfers in the style of matching grants (e.g. the enforcement
budget financed by the central government, with a component based on the induced
compliance rate); and
'4The General Environmental Policy  Act includes  a wide-based  tax on fuel consumption, and the
Act on Pollution of Surface Water levies a charge on water-borne emissions  to finance treatment.
See Jansen (1991).- 13 -
B0x  Is  Int.r-governsental  Relations  and  the  Principal-agent  Paradigm
An hierarchical government structure can be characterized as a relationship
in which the feasible actions and welfare levels of the lower level (i.e.
local government) are determined in part by the actions of the higher level
(i.e. the central government).  For example, by the use of non-matching
inter-governmental grants, the center can  expand the set of feasible actions
available to the local government.
On the other hand, matching grants are often employed as stimulative
instruments, to encourage a  local contribution to national objectives (see,
for example, Shah (1991)). Presumably, explicit encouragement is needed if
and when the private incentives of the local government are not sufficient
to  guarantee  unsolicited  contributions.  In  the  context  of  pollution
control,  inter-governmental  transfers  can  be  used  to  induce  specific
behavioral  responses  from  local  governments,  such  as  lower  emissions,
stricter enforcement, and more efficient monitoring.
One approach  to  these hierarchical incentive  problems is  described  under
the principal-agent paradigm.  (See  Stiglitz (1988)  for  a lucid  exposition.)
Within'  this  framework, the  central  government has  the ability  to write
contracts with the local government, stipulating various required actions
and (perhaps) subsequent financial transfers.
The  strength of the  terms of  the contract  typically  vary with  the
constitutional division of powers between government levels.  For instance,
in  a unitary state such  as Zambia, the "contracts"  between central and local
bodies  may  restrict  the  choices  of  local  authorities  substantially.
Alternatively, in a loosely federated system such as Brazil or Yugoslavia,
the contract terms may be less restrictive for the lower level.
In extreme cases of local autonomy, aa in Papua New Guinea and Belgium
for instance,  inter-governmental relations may be better described  as a
bargaining  game.  Such  a  game  theoretic  framework  has  been  applied
extensively  to international  environmental  problems, where as yet, no
central  planner exists  (for example, Hoel  (1991)).  The principal-agent
fra*ework is  preferred in this  study to  avoid the  complications  of
endogenous  constitution  formation  and public  choice  theory.  We make the
realistic  assumption  that much policy  reform  must occur within a fixed
governmental  hierarchy.
(iii)  those with more complex transfer components (e.g. based on the local
govemment's  ex  ante  prediction  of  pollution  levels, and  ex  post
outcomes, or on the performance of other local authorities in similar
circumstances).
In developing countries, the choice of incentive scheme may be limited to the simpler
alternatives. For example,  in remote areas, inefficient communications  and unreliable payments from
the  central government may mean that  instruments without explicit financial transfers are most
appropriate.- 14 -
(ii)  Local govenmnents as residual claimants
Local enforcement agencies  need to be given  appropriate incentives  to implement national
pollution control policies. Turel et. al. (1991) remark in the case of Turkey,
'Obviously if [thel majority of the taxes and fines are to be  transferred to the
central administration, the local administrations will not feel compelled to collect
these revenues.'
This is an  often  cited reason  for  the  inactivity of  local governments in general.  The  central
government's taxing power always  threatens to result in at least part of any locally  collected revenue
finding its way to the national treasury.
Suppose the central government can credibly  relinquish its right to arbitrarily  appropriate
local revenue.  A simple solution to the incentive problem then is for the center to choose tax rates
or emission quota and fine levels, and allow the local enforcement agency to  retain all (or a fixed
proportion) of the revenue it collects. Thus, Turel et. al. suggest that
"[flines and charges collected locally..  .and  local taxes..  .are burdened upon  [the]
local population, and should be left to local administrations."
The allusion to burden bearing suggests  some kind of fairness criterion in the allocation of tax or fine
revenue.  However, irrespective of the equity implications  of the policy, the incentive for allocative
efficiency  may  be improved by allowing  the local authorities to retain the revenue collected. In fact,
this form of incentive mechanism is similar to the framework employed in the regulation of utilities
in  some industrial countries.  In the  United Kingdom for example, an average electricity price
(emission tax in the present context) is set by the center, and the supplier Oocal  govermment)  given
the rights to all profits (revenue)." 5
"See, for example, Vickers and Yarrow (1988).- 15  -
From a pure public finance point of view, it is unlikely that such earmarking of public
revenue from the implementation of pollution control mechanisms  will be optimal.  However, in a
related context McCleary (1990) notes that
"...earmarking may contribute  to  improved  collection  performance,  and
perhaps even a better  utilization of the monies since concerned users and
officials are better monitors of performance than more distant authorities."
If local administrations are to be given the correct incentives by allowing  them to keep
the proceeds from their monitoring and enforcement activities, the question then arises over the
appropriate instrument to be used. We willshow (the details are relegated to Appendix 1) that when
the local government has some knowledge of firms' abatement costs, and cares only about revenue,
a quantity instrument or technical design standard may dominate the use of a tax.  This result is
motivated below.
If there is to be any incentive problem between central and local levels of government,
the objectives of each must differ.  We take the objective of the central government to be a given
reduction in pollution at least cost. Whatever the costs  of enforcement, this will  require that marginal
abatement costs are equalized across firms.
As an extreme example, we will assume that the local government does not care about
pollution.  Centrally mandated pollution taxes or fines then represent an instrument for revenue
generation, through  which the local government can increase its budget.  For a given level of
resources committed to monitoring, the enforcement policy  will be conducted so as to maximize  tax
or fine revenue.
If the local authority has no information  about abatement costs, then a uniform inspection
policy - i.e. one where the probability of inspection is the same for all firms - is probably the best
option.  However, if the local government has information about firms' costs, then it can choose to
inspect some more often tian  others.- 16 -
Consider the case of a centrally set emission tax rate.  If the enforcement agency has a
good idea of which firms have high costs of abatement and which have low, then  it will aim its
inspections at the high cost ones.  This is because high cost firms will prefer to pay the tax on a
relatively large emission  base than to abate, whereas low cost firms would prefer to abate and face
a smaller tax bill. Thus, concentrating inspection activities  on high cost firms yields  the local authority
higher revenue.
Clearly, the low cost firms - if they know they will not be inspected for tax liabilities  -will
not reduce their emissions to the level required by the tax, so it will pay the government to inspect
them with some low probability. Nonetheless, the equilibrium  strategy of the government will  be one
of allocating a high proportion of its enforcement budget to the inspection of high cost firms.
In equilibrium, marginal costs of abatement will not be equalized across firms, so the
reduction in emissions will be achieved at an inefficiently  high cost.  In fact, the perverse outcome
can result whereby firms with high costs of abatement reduce emissions more than those with low
costs. Clearly this does not conform with the center's objectives.
The problem lies in the fact that the local government, as a revenue maximizer,  acts as
an  (imperfectly) discriminating monopolist.  On the other  hand, as shown. in Appendix 1, if an
emission  standard is used, inspections will  be biased towards low cost firms,  which, in equilibrium,  are
responsible for the majority  of abatement.  4'his may be more cost effective than the outcome under
the tax, and is due to the high cost in terms of inspections of eliciting a given compliance rate from
high cost firms.
An alternative strategy available  to the central government could be to use an instrument
which restricts the local agency's ability  to discriminate between firms. For example, a mandatory
design standard (with accompanying  fine) may impose the same costs of compliance on all firms. In
this case the local government will  employ a uniform inspection policy.- 17 -
In both of these case-, the improvement in the central government's control of the local
enforcement agency is obtained at the cost of assigning  an instrument which is  otherwise less efficient
than a tax. However, when enforcement is costly and government objectives  diverge, total costs may
be lower.
(iii)  The enforcement budget as a control device
In part  (ii) above we considered the  use of a  simple implicit transfer mechanism to
stimulate local enforcement activities,  and the consequences for instrument choice. We now consider
how, for  a  given instrument, the  implicit transfer might be  used  to  improve the  enforcement
incentives of local governments.
Our discussion is based on the work of Jones and Scotchmer (1990), who consider the
implementation of a regulatory design or performance standard. The transfer mechanism available
to the central government is defined in terms of the local authority's enforcement budget.  The
budget can be affected by the use of direct lump-sum  payments (i.e. categorical  grants), which govern
its overall size.  In  addition, the  central government can use a  transfer  conditional upon  the
enforcement policy chosen by the local authority. In particular, a proportion of th:  collected fines
is used to finance the enforcement budget.
In the model, the objectives of the central and local administrations differ with respect
to the weight given firms' costs  of compliance (e.g. costs of abatement, costs of adopting the required
technology, etc.).  In particular, the local government does not take these into account, and seeks to
maximize the compliance rate.' 6 This is despite the fact that it has some knowledge, in the form
of a signal, of tfie compliance costs.  The signal is costless for the local authority to observe, and
allows it to identify which firms, ceteris  paribus, are likely to comply.
'Shis  could arise because the firms are owned by interests in other parts of the country.- 18-
If inspection rates are equal across firms, compliance rates will be higher for those with
low costs. Therefore, eliciting a given rate of compliance requires a greater probability  of inspection
for high cost firms than for low cost firms.
For a given enforcement budget, the local government's optimal inspection policy then
induces a certain distribution of compliance rates.  In fact, in the specific model employed by Jones
and Scotchmer, uniform compliance rates for all inspected firms are induced, irrespective of their
costs of compliance.' 7 This is not optimal ifrom a national perspective;  it  .enter,  desiring cost
effectiveness, would prefer firms with low compliance costs to  comply more than those with high
compliance costs.
However, if the enforcement budget is constrained, then firms with very high cost signals
are not inspected at all.  This is because eliciting compliance from these firms requires a very high
inspection rate, which is costly  for the local government. Thus restricting  the size of the enforcement
budget can ensure that those firms with very high compliance costs do not comply, in line with the
center's objectives.
Of those inspected, the central government would like the lower cost ones to  comply
more. This will be possible if, for a given compliance rate, the marginal cost to the local authority of
eliciting compliance of high cost firms can be made higher than that  for low cost firms.  The
enforcement agency will then be induced to switch some inspections from high to low cost firms.
'7This result is specific to the model.  It is implicitly  assumed that locally there is a one to one
relationship between marginal and absolute compliance rates, independent of the cost signal. The
local government's optimum is characterized by equal marginal compliance rates, and hence, by
assumption, equal absolute rates.- 19 -
If the local government does not receive any fine revenue, the marginal costs of eliciting
compliance for low ard  high cost firms are equal when compliance rates are equal."  However, if
the local government can retain a proportion of the fines it collects,  then, at equal compliance rates,
the marginal  cost of eliciting compliance of high cost firms is higher than that for low cost firms. This
is because
"...[fine]rebates are lost on more inframarginal  inspections in a high-cost class
than in a low-cost class, and this maies the agency's effective marginal costs
of inspections higher in the high cost sector."' 9
Hence by linking the budget of the enforcement agency more closely to its actions, the
central government can induce more efficient targeting.  By reducing the lump-sum component of
the transfer, and forcing the  agency to be partially self financing through its fine collections, the
central authority can make the inspection of low cost firms more attractive than otherwise.
(iv)  Comparative incentive schemes and enforcement
The  transfer  mechanisms of  the  preceding examples have  been  simple enough  to
implement, and have not required significant  communication  resources. In many  developing  countries
this is an important constraint.  However, by using a richer incentive structure, tighter control of the
regulatory activities  of the local government can be achieved. In middle income developing countries
the necessary administrative infrastructure may well exist to facilitate this objective.
The general problem is that of regulating a regulator.  When the local regulator cannot
be controlled directly,  the center needs to indirectly  monitor its activities. One general method is to
use a comparison with another observable variable to infer information about the local authority's
actions.  Three possibilities are discussed below:
'"This follows since the  marginal compliance rate is just  the inverse of the marginal cost of
compliance.
'9 "ones  and Scotchmer (1990), page 68.- 20 -
(a)  'eomparing  the performances of a number of local regulators. This is the
idea of regulatory (or yardstick) competition;'
(b)  comparing the performance of the regulator in different time periods;
and
(c)  comparing the ex ante predictions of the regulator with observab.e ex
post outcomes. 2'
(a)  Interjiurisdictional Regulatory Competition
When two regulators are given similar tasks in similar situations, the  results of their
actions can be  meaningfully compared.  In  this case, the  results of one  can be  used to  infer
information about the actions of the other.'
Consider the motivation of enforcement effort. When there is only one regulating agent,
it can claim that the costs of monitoring and enforcement are high, due to inspection difficulties  or
high compliance costs of firms. The center may  then be forced to fund the local enforcement budget
based on the exaggerated claim.
Now suppose neighboring  communities  face similar  pollution problems (with no spill-over
effects) and that each is to be controlled by a local regulator.  If firms' abatement costs, and the
effective costs of monitoring and enforcement, are both correlated across localities, the  level of
abatement attained in one can be used to determine the degree of effort exerted in the other.
More specifically,  the enforcement budget of an  agency can be positively tied to the
difference between the ambient air quality of its jurisdiction and that of the other.  While a part of
the budget should cover "reasonable"  costs (i.e. ones which the center knows must be covered), the
'See  Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1982), Schleifer (1985).
2 "See  Demski and Sappington (1987).
22This  kind of competition has been used in some defence procurement contracts in the US.-21  -
variable part gives the regulator the incentive to enforce emission reduction until the true marginal
costs of doing so equal the marginal benefits.  If pollution levels in one community  continue to be
worse than expected, a revision of the "reasonable"  costs may be necessary.
Of course, the mechanism  is open to abuse if the local regulators can collude, and agree
to some sub-optimal level of enforcement. Also, inducing  this kind of regulatory competition is only
desirable if the underlying costs in each jurisdiction are closely  correlated.
(O) Inter-temporal  Comparisons
Instead of comparing results between jurisdictions, where costs of enforcement may  differ
considerably, it is possible to  compare performance in a  single locality over  time.  If  costs are
positively  correlated  from year to  year, then next year's budget can be made sensitive to relative
improvements  in ambient environmental quality.
One potentially perverse effect of this kind of scheme is that resources are transferred
to localities which have good abatement records. Once a significant  improvement  has been achieved,
the incentive transfers should be reduced.  If no improvement occurs, it is not necessarily  a sign that
"effort"  is lacking  on the part of local governments, but that extra resources are needed to improve
ambient environmental quality.
This points to the need to balance incentive costs with the actual costs of abatement.
Concentrating solely on the first factor, in this example, may induce a local governmnent  to engage
in no enforcement activities.  If its initial enforcement budget is too  low to  effect a significant
reduction in pollution, it may choose a zero enforcement level, knowing  that its budget would not be
increased in the following  year in any case.- 22 -
(c)  Using Flrm Behavior to Monitor Regulatory Activity
The previous examples have investigated ways  of inducing local enforcement of central
policies.  This has been  motivated by the  observation in  Section 2 that,  ceteris parlbus, local
monitoring may be  expected to  be more efficient than central.  Local governments can also be
expected to have access to information regarding the potential for abatement, as well as whether it
actually occurs. This knowladge is useful in policy  choice, and is valuable to a central policy maker.
Suppose the  central government wishes to  give tax  incentives to  firmns  to  invest in
abatement technology. The size of the appropria,e tax break depends on the costs of adopting the
technology.'  For example, if the adoption will  cause serious disruption to production processes and
other input markets, the required incentive is necessarily  high.
The local government may be in a better position to determine these costs of adoption,
but will likely  Fur a cost of its own in doing so.  The center must then give the local authority
sufficient  incentive to  become, informed  about  abatement  possibilities, and  to  transmit  that
information to the center.
One way to  make it attractive for the local agency to become informed is to base its
incentive payment on a comparison of the agency's ex ante prediction of pollution control, and the
actual ex post outcome.  If it is informed about the costs of adoption, then it will have a better
chance of predicting the  outcome.  The center  is then  able to  implement a more accurate tax
incentive for the firm, since it has better knowledge about its adoption costs.
An advantage of this scheme is that  the  actions of  the local authority need not  be
monitored by the center. 24 The only measurement that has to be made is, in the case of airborne
emissions for example, that of the ambient air quality.
'If  the technology does not exist, the adoption costs also include R&D expenditures.
24In fact, often it may be expected that they are not observable.- 23 -
(v)  Summary
We have seen that the incentive costs of a particular assignment choice may be reduced
by the  use of implicit or  explicit inter-governmental transfer schemes.  These schemes vary in
sophistication, requiring various  institutional capacities, and  resulting in  outcomes  of  varying
efficiency.
4.  HlORIZONTAL!CO-ORDINATIOQN
In the previous section we analyzed  various vertical inter-governmental  structures as they
related to pollution control mechanisms. But in practice, each of the levels  of government is divided
horizontally, at the local level along jurisdictional lines, and at the central level into ministries and
departments. It was shown in Section 2 that objectives  may well  diverge between agencies within the
same level of government.  In this section we discuss ways of coordinating the actions of these
horizontally related bodies.
The obvious mechanism  by which horizontal coordination failures can be resolved is that
of recentralizing the decision process. The costs of such a proposal may he high, and the extent to
which inter-jurisdictional and inter-ministerial coordination failures are replaced by bureaucratic
incompetence suggests that the resolution will be far from complete, and will most likely result in
negative net consequences.'
The present section is divided into two parts.  The first addresses some coordination
problems at the local level arising  from environmental spillovers. It will  be seen that, contrary to the
Coasean orthodoxy, the  assignment of property  rights can matter, and  the  appropriate  initial
distribution of these can be an effective policy instrument.  Operationally, this translates into an
efficiency  (as opposed to equity) argument in favor of uniform ..4tional standards. The second part
5Estache  and Taylor (1991b) note a similar point.- 24 -
considers the problems of inter-ministerial  coordination at the central level, and suggests  that explicit
methods of  policy management be  pursued,  such  as the  use of  high-level inter-departmental
committees.
(i)  Environmental spillovers, negotiations, and property rights
If pollution crosses  jurisdictional  boundaries,  should the central government apply  uniform
emission standards to all local bodies, or should the individual  local governments be able to choose
their environmental policies themselves? This is an example  of the first dimension of the assignment
choice identified in section 2 - viz. who should decide on ambient quality targets or emission levels?
As long as all affected parties can negotiate efficiently,  and there are no extreme disparities  of income
between jurisdictions, there should be no reason for the central government to be involved. This
sub-section examines some of the impediments  to efficient negotiation, and policy prescriptions for
their alleviation.'
We will see that in some important cases, a passive agency encompassing  the full extent
of the pollution problem can effectively  facilitate the coordination of its members. The agency is not
required to actively participate in the negotiation mechanism, but fills the role of an information
processor.  In  general, it can ensure coordination by allocating pre-negotiation property rights
appropriately.  This allocation can be achieved operationally by applying  a uniform standard across
jurisdictions with the proviso that the standard may  be exceeded as long as all affected parties agree.
'When  there  are no spillover effects there  will be no need for jurisdictions to  negotiate on
environmental matters.  Oates (1990) has argued strongly that uniform standards in the US are very
costly  for California and that targets should be set on a state by state basis. Uniform'ty, in this case,
may be a result of what he describes as "political  realities".- 25 -
Alternatively, negotiations can be expedited through the use of a  subsidy.  It  should be noted
however, that  this is not a subsidy to abatement in the usual sense, and is thus not open  to the
criticisms  of such instruments.'
We consider a simple case of one jurisdiction  emitting pollutants which hurt another. This
is the most oft-cited form of externality in the economics literature.  The alternative to active central
intervention (by means of direct regulation,  or a Pigouvian  tax -i.e. a matching  grant) is a negotiated
settlememn  between the parties. It is assumed that local governments control the pollution of resident
firms, and that it is the local governments which negotiate.  There are at least two impediments to
this Coasean method of resolution.
First, the local governments may not have the institutional capacity to enable efficient
communication.  In  poor  areas,  isolated  by  long  distances, but  nonetheless  environmentally
interdependent, this can be a significant  problem.  Unregulated motorized pumping for irrigation in
Bangladesh is a major factor in the lowering of the water table  which renders shallow wells with
suction pumps in other jurisdictions ineffective.'  In such cases it may be necessary for the central
or regional government to provide the requisite infrastructure,  or to make second best decisions  itself.
A more fundamental constraint to efficient  Coasean negotiation is the presence of private
information. To see this, consider Figure 2.  Town 1 emits pollutants at a rate  y  into a river which
is used by town 2. The marginal  benefit to town 1 decreases as emissions  increase, while the marginal
damage to town 2 increases with emissions. Town I would like to emit at a level of  y',  while its
optimal level of emissions is y*.  We may think of  y'  as the total potential level of emissions,  the
rights to which are divided between the towns. At the optimum, town I receives y  emission  rights,
'1n particular, it has been argued that abatement subsidies  may discourage technical innovation,
or lead to excessive  entry into a polluting industry.
'Briscoe  and deFerranti (1988).- 26 -
and town 2  (y'- y7) , which it does not use.  The Coasean  theory of bargaining  says  that in a
situation  like this, the initial  allocadon  of pollution  rights  does not effect  the final  allocation  if it is
possible  for the parties  to trade efficieAtly.  Thus, if initially  town 1  has y' rights,  it will  sell (y'-y*)
to town  2 at such  a price that both towns  will  be better off. Similarly,  efficient  emission  levels  result
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FIGURE 2
However, if the  benefits and costs of  emissions  are privately known, then in any
negotiation  each  party  willhave  an incentive  to misrepresent  the impact  of emission  control  on itself.
Town 1  will  claim  that the costs  of abatement  are prohibitive,  while  town 2 will  claim  that increased
emissions  impose  on it a high social  cost. It is hard for each  to know  what y* is in this case.
Nonetheless,  it is possible  for the parties to devise contracts which make it in their
individual  interests  to tell the truth about the effects  of pollution. This is the general  problem of
mechanism  design  (see Myerson,  1979,  1981).  Truthful  revelation  is achieved  by requiring  that side- 27 -
payments be made which explicitly  incorporate the negative effects that each claim has on the other
party. Defining the side payments in this way  ensures that each agent internalizes any external effects
of its reported preferences. Thus, if the polluting town I claims high costs of abatement, then it
receives a large allocation of pollution rights.  However, this imposes high external costs on the
polluted party, town 2, and so town I is required to pay for its claim. As Farrell (1987) notes,
"This is not for reasons of justice or equity (though those might apply too);
it is because only if you [the polluter] must make such a payment will you
have the right incentives to claim intense preference when, and only when,
you feel it."
This principle can be seen as a general rule for allocative  efficiency:  you should pay for (receive in
accordance with) the effects of your (others') actions.'
Suppose, for example, that town 1 initially  holds the right to pollute.  From Figure 2, it
can be seen that for the given marginal damage curve of town 2, town 1 must receive a payment
equal to the area  A + B  to induce it to truthfully reveal its marginal benefit schedule.  On the
other hand, for a given marginal benefit curve for town 1, town 2 will reveal its marginal damage
schedule truthfully only if it must pay a sum equal to area A . This payment system is incentive
compatible, and results in the efficient level of nollution, y' .
There is an immediate problem however with this mechanism. The required payment by
town I is less than the required payment to town 2, the difference being the area  B . It is thus
unworkable, unless a lump-sum  subsidy  of at least that amount is available. One source for such a
subsidy is from outside the system - e.g. from the general revenue of the central government."
Alternatively, the towns may be  willing  to pay a lump-sum fee into a find  to  cover the financing
requirements, equal to the expected value of  B , before they enter negotiations. But suppose town
'Bird  (1990) has espoused this principal in the context of inter-governmental  financial transfers.
IThis  possibility is discussed below.- 28 -
2 suffers very little damage at the margin: it has little to gain from a slight reduction in the emissions
of town 1, so will not be willing  to contrilute  much to the fund.  Similarly,  if town I has very high
marginal benefits from pollution, it will not stand to gain much from the mechanism. In this case,
the towns will not be willing  to pay  E(B)  beforehand to join the negotiation.
The same problem arises if town 2 initially has the  rights to  y'  units of emissions.
However, when the rights to emissions  are initially  distributed evenly between the towns, it turns out
each town is willing  to pay enough to join the negotiating mechanism. The reason is that now, each
town, no matter what its marginal benefit or damage schedule, expects to make a sizable gain from
trade.  Now if town 2 has a low damage schedule it will  expect to trade most of its rights to town 1
and make a profit: if town I has high costs of abatement, it will  expect to increase its emissions  and
also make a profit. Even the towns with midd!ing  or average benefit or damage schedules  will  expect
to make sufficient  profits to be willing  to contribute to the financing requirement. This result stems
from the work by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and Crampton et.al. (1987)  An illustrative
numerical example is presented in Appendix 2.
The reason why the  redistribution of  initial emission rights alleviates the inefficiency
problem can be stated as follows. To ensure truthful revelation, and hence efficient emission  levels,
the incentive compatible payment system described above must be used.  However, the mechanism
results in a deficit, which must be financed by lump-sum  contributions if the incentives  of the towns
are not to be distorted (and truth-telling lost). When pollution rights are irnitially  skewed in favor of
one town, there are some types of town that will  gain very little from engaging in the mechanism,  and
they will  be unwilling,  ex ante, to make lump-sum  contributions to cover the expected deficit. When
pollution rights are more evenly distributed, all types of each town expect to gain significantly  from
the mechanism,  and are thus wiliing  to finance it.- 29 -
Operationally, the result suggests  that initially  uniform standards across  jurisdictions may
be  used to  aid negotiations when information about costs and benefits is privately held.  These
standards may then be breached with the consent of all affected parties.  It is stressed that the
institutional capacity must exist for such negotiations to take place, but that this alone may not be
sufficient.
Alternatively, the central government may expedite the negotiation process by making
non-negotiation look relatively  unattractive.  Thus,  heavy sanctions could be levied upon disagreeing
local governments.  However, this is open to strategic abuse, say if a weak local body was held to
ransom by a stronger neighbor.  The relative attraction of participating in negotiations could be
achieved by the central government giving  the local participants a reward if they reach a settlement.
This can be thought of as a subsidy  to negotiation, as distinct from traditional subsidies  to abatement.
The solutions of the previous paragraph require the intervention of the regional agency
in a non-decision-making  role.  That is, the regional authority does not change marginal incentives
(e.g. marginal costs of abatement by the use of an emission  tax or abatement subsidy),  so does not
need to know the characteristics  of the negotiating parties in detail.  In this sense its role is passive,
and may not be too difficult  to implement.
On the other hand, problems may arise. If a subsidy  scheme is proposed, then it can be
implemented by allowing  the side payments to be made through the center.  This places the center
in somewhat of a monopolistic/monopsonistic  position. If it acts in a profit maximizing  fashion, then
its optimal strategy is to restrict trade, and the result will be socially  sub-optimal. 3"  Since the central
and regional governments in developing countries often face tight budget constraints, the temptation
to act in this way could be considerable.
"See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Theorem 4.- 30 -
Thus, to overcome the information-induced  barrier to the efficient allocation of emissions,
the central authority has three alternatives:
(i)  It  can act  as a  broker  or  financial agent between  the  localities, and  implicitly
contribute a subsidy  to the negotiating process. This arrangement will  be susceptible
to the followin- disadvantages:
(a)  The  center  could  act  as  a  profit  maximizer,  and  exploit  its
monopolistic/monopsonistic  position. 32
(b)  The municipalities  could collude, and elicit a larger subsidy  than required
from the center.  This possibility  may not be significant,  since the ability
to  collude would suggest an efficient bargain was possible in the  first
place.
(c)  The additional transactions costs may be important, and could lead to
implementation delays.
(ii)  It can threaten sanctions against the localities (e.g. the withholding of future
intergovernmental grants) to force the agents to participate in the contract. The
main constraints impeding this approach are:
(a)  The credibility  of the regional authority's threat (i.e. the problem of time
inconsistency 33).
(b)  The  possibility of  strategic delays by  towns with strong  bargaining
positions.
(c)  The legality and/or political feasibility  of such a  policy.
(iii)  It can define property rights in such a way that the participation constraints do
not  bind.  This may be achieved by setting uniform standards which can be
breached  only  with the  consent  of  all relevant  parties.'  The  significant
attraction of this approach is that  it requires no outside subsidy. The primary
concerns with the policy are:
'3Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1990) similarly note the possible inefficiency of  involving a self-
interested third party in debt negotiations.
3Kydland and Prescott (1977).
"The  initial allocation, y'/2 each, need not be symmetric. In general the participation constraints
will be  non-binding for a  range of  initial allocations centered on the  equal shares point.  See
Crampton et. al. (1987).- 31 -
(a)  Possible rent-seeking behavior of municipalities - it may not be easy to
change traditional property rights;
(b)  The commitment  of the center not to interfere with the ex  post outcome
of the bargaining process; and
(c)  The  possibility that  a  polluting  locality will strategically increase  its
emissions  above its desired level before the central authority allocates the
shares (so that  ex post  it gets  a larger, and possibly most preferred,
absolute level of pollution rights).
The rent-seeking problem can be circumvented  by committing,  through legislation,  to an equal shares
rule (i.e. setting the uniform standard at half the unnegotiated pollution level,  y').  The general
problem of commitment in (b) is a characteristic of all government policies, and there is no reason
why it should be any more problematic in the present circumstance. Finally, the possible negative
effects of strategic behavior could be mitigated by the use of a range of past emission levels in the
allocation of property rights (say by letting  y'  be some weighted average of past emission levels).
Do these arguments have any empirical basis? It is always  difficult  to distill single causes
or effects from complex bargaining processes, but the following  example is illustrative of the notion
that outside coercion may be necessary to bring parties to the negotiating table.  In the late 1960s
it became apparent to some Dutch farmers that their source of water, the greater Rhine river system,
was being contaminated by French salt mines upstream.  Potential gains from trade went unrealized
as the French, who possessed full de facto rights to the use of the water, refused to negotiate. In the
early 1980s,  the European Court handed down a judgement compelling France to negotiate  This
resulted  in the French  finding an  alternative means of disposal for unused salt, paid for by the
Netherlands.- 32 -
Distributional  Issues: A Caveat
The models of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and Crampton et. al. (1987) discussed
above implicitly  assume a constant marginal  social utility  of income, common to all localities or towns.
Also, the incomes of each are assumed to be high enough to cover any necessary side payments.
These two assumptions, especially  the first, may not hold in inter-jurisdictional  matters.
Bird (1990) has  suggested that  inter-governmental grants  can only be  defended  as
equalization instruments if they can improve allocative  efficiency. Whether this is acceptable or not
is debatable, but the present case shows that efficiency  improvements  can be achieved, in theory, by
improving the distribution of income. 35
The general issue is whether environmental policy should be used as a redistributive
instrument, or if the equity consequences should be managed by the central government through
explicit distributional policies.  This will clearly depend on the efficacy  of redistributive programs.
If these are weak or non-existent, weight may also have to be given to the distribution of income in
the design of pollution control policies.
For example, suppose a low income town is adversely affected by the discharges of an
upstream factory.  Even if property rights are distributed as described above (i.e. "evenly"),  the
downstream town  may not  be  able to  afford to  pay for  a  further  reduction  in  emissions.  If
redistributive programs are ineffective, it may be  better  for  the  central government to  directly
intervene and force a further reduction.  The efficient discharge level may not result, but without
increasing the poor town's income explicitly, this central intervention may at least  improve the
outcome.
3 "That is, if incomes are unequally distributed, the use of welfare measures which are additively
separable in money and the disutility  of emissions may not be meaningful.- 33 -
pi)  Inter-ministerial  coordination
Nearly  all governments  have some kind of-  ministerial  division  of responsibilities  and
powers. As soon as the policies  of one portfolio  have  consequences  for those of another, there is
a strong  possibility  that uncoordinated  actions  will  yield  inefficient  outcomes.
Often these problems  are dismissed  as 'political", deriving  from rent-seeking  behavior
on the part of high ranking  officials.  This is certainly  a problem  in many  countries  - developing  and
industrial  alike - but coordination  problems  can arise from the specific  mandates  of the ministries
involved,  even when officials  act in accordance  with  these mandates.
As before, the divergence  in ministerial  objectives  can be interpreted as deriving  from
mandates  which  refer to the welfare  of different  groups  of individuals.  This suggests  that when
efficient  ministerial  actions  are not forthcoming,  some  institutional  change  is necessary.  These may
be  in the  form of  improvements  in the  consistency  of mandates, or  the creation of explicit
coordinating  institutions  (e.g.  high-level  inter-departmental  committees).
There are many  examples  of inter-ministerial  coordination  problems. For example,  the
Environment  Ministry  in Turkey  has the responsibility  of protecting  natural  resources. In potential
tourist areas this would  require some control over development  projects. However,  housing  and
lodging  are the official  responsibility  of the Ministry  of Construction  and Settlement.'  These
ministries  implicitly  act in the interests  of different  groups:  the first  predominantly  in the interests  of
local residents,  and the second in the interests  of holiday  makers  (and developers).
An example  of acid  rain caused  by  sulfur emissions  from  power  plants  in the mid-west  of
the US has been studied  by Baron (1985).  Here the Enviromental Protection  Agency  (EPA) and
the public  utility  commission  (PUC)  are involved.  The EPA  is charged  with  protecting  environnental
3'See Turel et. al. (1991).  Other examples  not explicitly  related to pollution questions are
de3cribed  in Bahl  et. at. (1984).- 34 -
quality throughout  the  US,  while the  PUC's  mandate  essentially requires  fair  treatment  for
consumers. However, in the case of acid rain, the individuals  affected by the pollution (residents of
New England) differ from the consumers of electricity in the mid-west. A cost effective reduction
in emissions would generally require both a reduction in output (with consequent increase in price)
and a modification of the production process (e.g. through the installation of scrubbers). However,
the PUC is unlikely to be  willing to raise the price to the efficient level, since this would mean
mid-westerners  were paying  for the benefits of lower emissions  accruing to New England residents. 37
The EPA, taking this into account, will be  forced to  require the  adoption of a  more stringent
technical standard than otherwise.
This kind of uncoordinated behavior would not be inefficient if the ministries' mandates
were consistent (i.e. referred to the same individuals).3 8 The example shows however, that in the
case of pollution control, inconsistent mandates can prevent  cost effective emission reductions.
Another example from the US is the ongoing dispute between the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power (supplying water and electricity  to 3.4 million  customers) and the California Department
of Fish and Game over the use of water from the Owens River. 39
One solution to these horizontal coordination problems is to precisely and exhaustively
define consistent mandates.  This, however, would require the identification of a large number of
contingencies. It would most likely shackle the central government with red tape, the costs of which
would outweigh the efficiency  gains sought in the original ministerial division.
A more plausible alternative would be to  create a  formal or  informal institution to
facilitate inter-departmental coordination. Thus, the efficiency  gains of the ministerial  structure could
'Ibis  assumes that property rights initially reside with the generators of electricity.
3 'Note  that if two agents' objectives are identical, Nash equilibrium is efficient.
3'New York Times, (1991).- 35  -
be retained, while averting unnecessary conflicts  of interest.  Importantly, the representatives on the
coordinating body must have sufficient authority to negotiate on behalf of their departments, and if
necessary make compromises. Othervise, as witnessed in some industrial countries (e.g. Australia),
inter-departmental committees can prove ineffective  in engaging in meaningful  dialogues over shared
concerns. Finally,  it is noted that in practice, inter-ministerial  and vertical coordination problems may
easily be juxtaposed.  For example, in Quang Ninh province in north-eastern  Vietnam, heavily
polluting coal mining is undertaken by a national state owned enterprise.  However, health care
responsibilities rests with the local governments. It is clear from the direct linkage between these
activities that both inter-sectoral and inter-governmental coordination is likely to be necessary.'
(il)  Summary
Inter-jurisdictional pollution  problems can  be  addressed through  active or  passive
involvement of the  central government. Active intervention policies include jurisdiction-specific
emission standards, abatement subsidies (i.e. matching  grants), and Pigouvian taxes.  These require
information about  relative costs and  benefits of  emissions to  the  relevant localities.  Passive
instruments can be used to facilitate efficient Coasean bargaining between the jurisdictions, avoiding
the  information requirements characteristic of active instruments, but  are effective only if good
communication channels exist between localities.
At the level of central government, inter-ministerial coordination failures are often the
consequence of inconsistent mandates.  One solution is to precisely define ministerial mandates so
that  no  inconsistency arises, but  this  is likely to  be  infeasible.  High-level inter-departmental
committees may then be required to explicitly  coordinate central government policy.
'°See United Nations Development Program (1991).- 36-
S. CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A number of characteristics of pollution control programs have been identified which
suggest that  it is unlikely that any single level of government should undertake all aspects of an
environmental policy. Policy  decisions  regarding  targets and instruments should be made with respect
to the most accurate and complete information available,  and should encompass  the full extent of the
problem. Effective implementation, including inspection, enforcement, and prosecution may require
the involvement  of all levels of government.
However, for any assignment  of responsibilities  between and within levels  of government,
an additional cost may be significant.  This is th_3  cost of coordinating government actions, and arises
from the divergence  of objectives  of different governmental bodies. Uncoordinated actions can then
result in inefficient outcomes.
The  coordination  of  government  policies  can  be  improved  by  the  use  of
inter-governmental incentive schemes. These may be more or less sophisticated,  depending on the
institutional capacity of the public sector.  All seek to maintain a degree of local decision making
authority, but to modify  the incentives  faced by local administrators. They can be used to facilitate
coordination  between  different  levels  of  government  (vertical  coordination),  or  between
administrative  bodies within the same government tier (horizontal coordination).
There  is a range of instruments available for vertical policy coordination.  Their use
depends  on  the  sophistication of  inter-governmental transfer  mechanisms, the  responsibilities
delegated to lo-wer  level agencies,  the objectives  of each level, and the information  structure between
these levels.  We have dealt particularly with the p.oblem of inducing local authorities to  adopt
efficient monitoring and enforcement po!icies.
One incentive device is to grant the local government financial autonomy, in the sense
that any taxes or fines it collects as a result of enforcement are retained locally. While this increases- 37 -
the level of enforcement, If the local government maximizes  revenue, it may introduce some bias in
the qualitative nature of inspection policies. For exanmple,  if an emission  tax is used, firms with high
costs of abatement could be forced to bear most of the reduction in emissions, On the other hand,
when the local government enforces a standard, most abatement is carried out by low cost abaters,
which is more efficient.  Therefore, there  are substantive implications for the  choice of control
instrument (tax or standard).
A more subtle form of financial incentiva is that of explicitly  affecting the enforcement
budget of a local regulator. It has been seen that  by controlling the size of the budget directly
through lump-sum transfers, and indirectly  through fine rebates, the central govetnment can modify
the inspection activities of a local regulatory agency in a welfare improving  fashion.
Finally, when the central government can make informative comparisons,  it may be able
to  improve the  incentives of local agents.  This comparison may be  with respect either  to  the
outcomes of actions by other local authorities, to the outcomes of previous actions by the same local
authority, or to the behavior of the firms under the local regulator's control.  The general point is
that the central government should make use of as much information  as is practicable to help reduce
principal-agent costs.
When local decisions are sub-optimal from a  regional or national perspective due to
inter-jurisdictional environmental spiilovers, a number of horizontal coordination instruments are
available. These include regulatory matching grants and the direct imposition of specific emission
quotas for each locality. However, the central government must have accurate information  if this type
of active involvement is to succeed.
Altematively,  local governments  can negotiate mutually  beneficial environmental  policies.
The central govenmment  then has open to it three forms of passive coordination policies to aid such
negotiations. It can provide incentives for the local governments to negotiate by rewarding them if- 38 -
they sign an agreement or punishing them if they don't.  In each case it will be better for the parties
to  come to the negotiating table rather than stay away.  The third policy is to  set moderate but
binding uniform national (or  regional) emission standards which can be  breached only with the
consent of all affected parties.  This has the effect of dividing the initial property rights equally
between local authorities which  ensures all will  wish  to participate in the neg tiation process we have
described.
Non-environmental spillovers  can result from specific policy choices.  For example, tax
competition and cost exporting may occur if there is sufficient mobility  of goods and capital. If this
leads to inefficient levels of pollution, central regulation may be necessary. However, this is more
an  argument for  improved fiscal policy in general,  than  environmental policy coordination in
particular.
Environmental policies will typically affect, or  be  affected by, other  sectors of  the
economy. When these sectors are subject to some kind of government policies, the coordination of
the actions of different ministries becomes important. Even when ministers act in accordance with
their individual  mandates, their actions may conflict  if decided upon non-cooperatively. One solution
to this problem is to precisely and exhaustively  define the responsibilities  of different ministries and
departments. However, this will be virtually impossible  in practice, so a more effective approach is
to have an explicit coordinating body (for example, a high-level inter-departmental committee).
Given the range of potential inter-governmental incentive instruments discussed above,
and the qualitative diversity  of pollution problems in developing countries, future research should be
directed at understanding which schemes  are useful and practically  implementable. This will  require
careful consideration of inter-governmental  relations, and the plausibility  of their modification.- 39 -
BlBLIOGRAPHY
Akerof, George (1970): "The Market for Lemons", Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-
500.
Asia Development Bank (1990): Economic Policies for Sustainable Development, ADB.
Atkinson, Anthony and Joseph Stiglitz (1980): Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw Hill,
(UK).
Bahl, Roy, Jerry Miner and Larry Schroeder (1984): "Mobilizing  Local Resources in Developing
Countries", Public Administration  and Development, 4, 215-230.
Baro, David and Roger Myerson (1982): "Regulating  a Monopolist With Unknown Costs",
Econometrica, 50, 911-930.
Baron, David (1985): "Noncooperative  Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality",Rand  Journal
of Economics, 16(4), 553-568.
Bartone, Carl (1990): "Water Quality and Urbanization in Latin America",  Water International,
15, 3-14.
Baumol, William and Wallace Oates  (1988): The Theory of  Environmental Policy, Cambridge
University  Press.
Besanko, David (1987): "Performance Versus Des.gn Standards in the Regulation of Pollution",
Journal of Public Economics, 34, 19 44.
Bienen, Henry, Devesh Kapur, James Parks and Jeffrey Riedinger (1990):  "Decentralization
in Nepal",  World Development, 18, 61-75.
Bird, Richard (1990): "Inter-governmental  Finance and Local Taxation in Developing Countries:
Some Basic Considerations for  Reformers", Public Administration and Development,  10(3),
277-288.
Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990): "Decentralization,  Duplication, and Delay",Journal of
Political Economy, 98(4), 803-826.
Briscoe, John and David deFerranti (1988): Water for Rural Communities:  Helping People Help
Themselves, World Bank.
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1988): "Multilateral  Sovereign Debt Reschedulings",
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, 35, 644-57.-40  -
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1990): "Cleaning  up Third World Debt Without Getting
taken to the Cleaners", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(1), 31-42.
Campos, iose Edgardo (1989): "Legislative  Institutions, Lobbying,  and the Endogenous Choice
of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice", Journal of
Law. Economics. and Organization, 5(2), 333-353.
Chikulo, B.C. (1985): *Reorganisation  for Local Administration in Zambia: An Analysis of the
Local Administration Act, 1980",Public  Administration  and Development, 5, 73-81.
Coase, Ronald (1960): "Te  Problem of Social Costs",The Journal of Law and Economics, 3,
1-44.
Conyers, Diana (1984): "Decentralization and Development: a Review of the Literature", Public
Administration and Development, 4, 187-97.
Crampton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer (1987): Dissolving  a Partnership Efficiently",
Econometrica,  55(3), 615-632.
Demski, Joel and David Sappington (1987): "Hierarchical  Regulatory Control", Rand JournalQo
Economics, 18(3), 369-383.
Downing, Paul and William Watson (1974): "The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Control",
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1, 219-236.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Emmanuel Jimenez (1991): "Choosing  Policy Instruments for Pollution
Control:  A Review",  World Bank working paper, WPS 624.
Estache, Antonio (1991): "Municipal  Environmental Issues in Brazil", mimeo, World Bank.
Estache, Antonio and Leon Taylor (1991a): "Surface  Water Pollution Control in Brazil: An
Overview of the Policy  Issues", mimeo, World Bank.
Estache, Antonio and Leon Taylor (1991b): "Controlling Water Pollution in Brazl:  Which
Government Level Should Do What?", mimeo, World Bank.
Fargeix, Andre (1990): "Enviromnental  Fund as Instrument of Environmental Polic',World
Bank working paper (draft).
Farrell, Joseph (1987): "Information and the Coase Theorem", Journal of Economic
p_rsective,  1(2), 113-129.
Green, Jerry and Jean-Jaques Laffont (1979): Individual Incentives in Public Decision Making,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977): "Optimal Allocation  of Public Goods: A Solution to the
"Free-rider" Problem",  Econometrica, 45, 783-809.- 41 -
Heady, Christopher (1990): "Public  Sector Pricing in a Fiscal Context", World Bank Research
Observer.
Helm, Dieter and Stephen Smith (1987): "Assessment:  Decentralisation and the Economics of
Local Government", OxfQrd  Review of Economic Policy,  3(2), i-xxi.
Hoel, Michael (1991): 'Global Environmental Problems:  The Effects of Unilateral Actions
Taken By One Country", JouMal of Enviromental  Economics and Management, 20, 55-70.
Jack, William (1990): 'Taxation and Pollution Control: A Theoretical Analysis",D.Phil. thesis,
Oxford University.
Jansen, H.M. (1991): "Western European Experiences With Environmental Funds", Institute for
Envirownental Studies.
Jimenez, Emmanuel, Vicente Paqueo and Ma. Lourdes de Vera (1988): "Does Local Financing
Make Primary Schools More Efficient? The Philippine Case", World Bank working  paper, WPS
69.
Jones, Carol and Suzanne Scotchmer (1990): "The Social Cost of Uniform Regulatory Standards
in a Hierarchical Government",  Journal of Environmental Economics  and Management, 19,61-72.
Kennedy, David (1986): "Controlling  Acid Rain, 1986",John F. Kennedy School Of
Government, Harvard University.
Kydlnd, Finn and Edward Prescott (1977): "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency
of Optimal Plans",Joumal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473491.
Maddock, Nicholas (1990): "On the Monitoring and Evaluation of Rural Development Projects
Ui ler  Decentralization", TWPR, 12(3), 249-260.
McCleary,  Will.am and Evamaria Uribe Tobon (1990): "Earmarking  Government Revenues in
Colombia", World Bank working paper, WPS 425.
McCleary,  William (1991): "Earmarking  Government Revenues: Does it Work?", World Bank
Research Observer, Volume 6, Number 1.
Mensah, Edward and Kevin Croke (1990): "Determinants  of Decision Making Under a
Decentralized Regulatory Environment: A Case Study of the  Asbestos Hazards Emergency
Response Act (AHERA)", Journal of Environmental Systems, 19(3), 231-236.
Myerson, Roger (1979): "Incentive  Cormpatibility  and the Bargaining Problem",  Econometrica,
47,61-73.
Myerson, Roger (1981): 'Optimal Auction Design",  Econometrica, 47, 61-73.- 42  -
Myerson, Roger and Mark Satterthwaite (1983): 'Efficient Mechanisms  for Bilateral Trading",
Journal of Economic Theory, 29,265-281.
Nalebuff, Barry and Joseph Stiglitz (1983): "Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory
of Compensation and Competition",  Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1), 21-43.
New York Times (1991): 'Los Angeles Considers Giving Water to Gain It", New York Times,
May 18, 1991.
Oates, Wallace, (1990):  Public Finamnce  with Several Levels of Government:  Theories and
Reflections", paper  preseanted  wo the 46th Congress of the  International  Institute  of Public
Finance, Brussels.
Oates, Wallace and Robert Schwabb (1988): "Economic  Competition Among Jurisdictions:
Efficiency  Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?",  Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-354.
Opschoor and Vos (1989): Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, OECD, Paris.
Pigou, A.C. (1920): The Economics of Welfare, London.
Ralston, Lenore, James Anderson, and Elizabeth Colson (1983): Voluntary Efforts in
Decentralized Management: Opportunities and Constiaivits  in Rural Management, Institute  of
International Studies, (Berkeley).
Rondinelli, Dennis (1990): "Financing  the Decentralization of Urban Services in Developing
Countries: Administrative Requirements  for  Fiscal Improvements", Studies in  Comparative
Intemational Development, Summer 25(2), 43-59.
Salmon, Pierre (1987): "Decentralisation  as an Incentive Scheme",  Oxford Review of Economic
Policv, 3(2), 24-43.
Sandmo, Agnar (1975): "Optimal  Taxation in the Presence of Externalities",  Scandinavian
iournal of Economics, 77, 86-98.
Schroeder, Larry (1988): "Intergovernmental  Grants in Developing Countries", World Bank
working paper, WPS 38.
Shah, Anwar (1990): "The New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil",  World Bank working paper, WPS
557.
Shleifer, Andrew (1985): "AlTeory  of Yardstick Competition",  Rand Journal of Economics,
16(3), 319-327.
Stiglitz,  Joseph (1988): "Principal  and Agent", Prinueton University  Discussion Paper, #12.
Takemoto, Kazuhiko (1989): "Air  Pollution Mitigation Strategies: Lessons From Japanese
Experience",  Working  paper, Environment  Division,  Technical  Department, Asia  Regional Office,
World Bank.- 43 -
Tiebout, C.M. (1956): "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", Journal of Political Economy,
64, 416-424.
Turel, Oktar et. al. (1991): "Environmental  Policy Objectives and Earmarked Funds", Turkish
Social Science Association.
United Nations Development Program  (1991): Report on Vietnam, Human Development
PrograMmin2  Office.
Vickers, John and George Yarrow (1988): Privatisation: An Economic Analysis,  MT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Weiss, Charles (1991): "Patterns of Environmental Management",  Environment Division,
Technical Department, EMENA Region, World Bank (draft).
Xepapadeas, A.P. (1991): "Environmental  Policy Under Imperfect Information", Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 20, 113-126.
Zeckhauser, Richard (1981): "Preferred Policies When There is a Concern for Probability of
Adoption", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 8, 215-237.-44 -
ApRedix  I
We assume initially that all firms have the same level of emissions,  yo , before any
control mechanism is implemented. There are two groups of firms, characterized by parameters  *L
and  'H  which correspond to different marginal abatement costs. Total abatement costs are taken
to be quadratic, so the costs of reducing emissions  from  y  to  y are  0,.(y%y) 2, for  J = L,H . For
simplicity,  these costs are taken to be observable by the local government.'  Thus, marginal benefits
from emissions are as shown in Figure 2.
The emission tax rate is  t.  Suppose the local authority can afford to inspect up to a
fixed proportion  p  of the firms (i.e. it makes at most  pn  inspections, where  n is the number of
~~~~-~~z-Y  ye;-  -N&M
'  "%
FIOURE  A.1
"The results of the case of a tax are not qualitatively  changed if a distribution of costs is assumed
about each cost level,  0,  . When the enforcement of a quota  is analyzed below, such a non-
degenerate distribution will be assumed.-45-
firms). Since it can observe the value of  #  for each firm, it can inspect different proportions in each
group,  PL and  pH  . For a firm of type *J,  the expected tax rate is then  ir  =pt.'
The revenue obtained by the  *  wernment is
R  - nfl'_y(4L,'tL)  +  Tay(oO  tN)]
The local government fhen s.lves the program
max  R  s.t  tL+rM  H  2s
WLD,N
where  7  =  pt  is fixed.  If  there  was no  constraint, the  agency could choose  TL  and  TN
independently. Interpreting the firms' marginal benefit curves as demand for emissions curves, the
government acts as a discriminating monopolist and sets marginal revenue from each type equal to
zero (=  marginal cost to local authority of "supplying"  emissions). This will result in  TH  >  rL  and
ym =  YL,  where  y, = y(4,T, j.
However, unless the tax rate  t  is high enough, the constraint will be binding (for a
given p ).  In this case, the effective tax rates ( TL  and  TrN)  must be lowered, keeping the marginal
revenue from each group of firms equal.  From Figure 2, this will  again result in  TL  < TH  , but now
also yL  > yH.
These results can be shown mathematically  by forming the Lagrangean for dte local
authority:
X  =  R  - XIr-(sL+TA
where  X 2 0 . Differentiation with respect to  rj  (J = L,H)  then yields
Virms are assumed risk neutral, so maximize  expected profits.46 -
n(y,+Ir  )  + A  a  0
with equality if  X is positive. Thus
YL  +L  4L&YH  =  O+H
when  A > 0,  which is just the equal marginal revenue rule.  Note also that if  R  is the maximized
value of revenue, then
=I  At .
OP
If the marginal cost of inspections is  c , then the cost of inspecting at a rate  p  is  cnp , and the
marginal cost of the inspection rate is  y = cn . Thus resources will be spent on  nonitoring until
Xt = y, or X =  y/t.  In particular, for all finite values of the tax rate, t,  X > 0,  and so YL  > YH.  This
result continues to hold when marginal costs of inspection are increasing. 3
How are the actions of the local authority determined when a quantity instrument is
assigned by the federal government? First note that if each firm has one of two cost levels (labelled
by XL  and -H ) which are observable to the local government, then a given enforcement policy will
3The result does require that the marginal  revenue curves intersect at zero, as is the case we have
analzyed Oinear marginal abatement costs and identical pre-tax emission levels).- 47 -
result in either zero or full compliance by the firms of each category. The optimization problem of
the local authority is then ill-defined. 4
It is more realistic to assume that the observation of  * gives the local government a
signal of a firm's costs, and that its true costs of abatement are parameterized by * + e , where  e
is unobservable and has a distribution  f(.)  on some bounded support, [-e 0,e 0j.  Now suppose that a
quota  y  is announced by the central government, with a fine  s , independent of the size of the
violation, to enforce it. The local government makes inspections and keeps all fine collections. If
it observes  *, and its inspection rate for  *j-firms is  p, , then the expected fine for a  X,-firm is
given by
J  '  S))
The total costs of compliance for a firm with marginal costs characterized by  Oj+e  are
B(y,O,+e) - B(j,+,+e)
where B(.,.) is the benefit function (the marginal  version of which is shown in Figure 2). In the case
of linear marginal  benefits, this is just
(4,,+e)(y  *-D2
4Tbere is no enforcement level which maximizes  the local agency's revenue.  As long as the
probability  of being inspected for a given category of firms is low enough, none of the firms comply.
Thus it is optimal to increase the inspection rate.  When this rate reaches some critical value,  p  ,
all firms comply (since they have the same costs) and so revenue is zero.  There is thus no optimal
inspection rate  p.-48 -
and a given expected fine  aI  defines a value  e,(o,)  below which all Orfirms comply, and above
which none do.'  This critical value is given by
The revenue of the local agency is
R(eL.e  ,)  = oL(eL)[ 1 -F(edlJ + a,(eH)[l-F(eH)]
where F'(.) = f(.) , and O,(f,)  is the inverse  of the critical  value  function ej(.) . Revenue  is to be
maximized  subject to the local agency's  enforcement budget constraint  OL  +  OH  2a , where  a =
sp and  p  is the total number of inspections. Taking the total differential of the previous expression,
we find
dR = [a'ted(1  -F(e)J - vL(eL)f(eL)]deL+
[aY(e,)[I-F(eH)]  - GH(eH2)eH)ldeH
Now suppose the local authority adopts an inspection policy that results in equal compliance from
both groups of firms; that is eL = EH  = e . This will  clearly  require a higher rate of inspection of the
high cost group than the low cost group, so that  u.(e)  >  OJ(E)  . From the xpression for  ej(orj)  we
5We will assume that solutions are interior, so that there are always  some firms that comply  and
some that don't in each cost group.-49.,
see that  el'  is independent of  J  . Therefore, a change  dEL =  -dEH is feasible for the local
authority. 6
The change in revenue with this reallocation of enforcement resources is
dR  =  (ov,e)-a;,(e))[1-F(e)]deL-(OL(e)-c(e))Ae)deL
The first term is zero, so since  OH(e)  > UL(e)  ,  the expression is positive. Therefore, it is optimal for
the local authority to induce a higher rate of compliance from low cost firms than from high cost
firms. For a given number of compliers  and hence a given level of abatement -this is strictly more
efficient than equal compliance rates.
The general result stemming  from this analysis  is that in using a tax to attain a given  level
of abatement, most of the reduction in emnissions  is undertaken by high-cost firms (recall the result
that  YL  > YH  ).  However, when a quota is used, most of the reduction in emissions is done by low-
cost firns.
This suggests that when the enforcement agency is a profit maximizer, the use of a
quantity instrument may be preferred.  However, this conclusion cannot be drawn immediately. The
problem is that  while more abatement is done  by low cost firms in this case, some firms do no
abatement.  On the other hand, when a tax is used, all firms make some reduction in emissions. The
relative size of total  costs of abatement  is thus not determined, and the  model must be  solved
completely to ascertain which instrument is in fact the most efficient.
Also the decision of the agency about its budget has been brushed over - we assumed
a fixed inspection budget, implying  a fixed number of inspections. It is possible that when inspectors
'Since  arL  +  OH = a , du = 0 =  doL + daH  for any feasible change in inspection policy (for a
given enforcement budget). Thus we require  doL = -dor . But  doL =  aL'(e)deL  =  -OH'(e)dfH  =  -dOH- so  -
are financed nationally this assumption isn't too bad.  It is very likely  that some local administrations
will not have the expertise and personnel to make a serious choice over aggregate inspection levels
themselves.-51  -
APPENDIX2'
An  intuitive explanation of  the  papers  by  Myerson and  Satterthwaite (1983) and
Crampton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) is presented.  We consider the allocation of a single,
indivisible  object, to agents with privately  known valuations.
The problem of allocating emission levels between two agents is different, if marginal
costs and benefits are not  constant, since the "object' - i.e. the total level of emissions - is split
between them at the optimum.  However, the same intuition carries over to that case.
Buyer and Seller
Consider a buyer and a seller with an object (belonging to the seller) to trade.  They
value the object at  b and  s respectively, independently and identically distributed uniformly on
[0,1] . An efficient trading mechanism  assigns the object to the buyer if and only if  b > s .
Suppose the buyer's valuation,  b , has been truthfully revealed.  The seller then will
either not sell (if s > b), or will  demand a price  b  (if s < b), since she can claim that  s  is very
close to  (but  less than)  b  . That  is, to  induce truthful revelation by the  seller, given truthful
revelation by the buyer, the seller must get all the consumer surplus, equal to  b-s .
On the other hand, suppose the seller's valuation, s , is known to the buyer. The buyer
will  then either not buy (if s > b), or will  pay a price  s  (if s < b), since it can claim b  is very close
to (but greater than)  s . That is, to induce truthful revelation by the buyer, given truthful revelation
by the seller, requires that the buyer gets all the consumer surplus.
Thus, each agent must receive the full consumer surplus, implying that efficient trade
is possible only if an outside subsidy,  equal to b-s, is available. (This corresponds to the requirement
for an outside subsidy, B , in the test.)  Ex ante, the expected value of the required subsidy  is
'lhanks  to Jeremy Bulow for helpful comments regarding this appendix.-52  -
E(b-s1b>s)  - E(b/2.  b)
= E(b 2 /2)
- 1/6  .
If  the  agents could be  convinced to  pay for  the  opportunity of using the  trading
mechanism,  enough money might be raised to finance the required subsidy. But consider the buyer
who values the object at just a little more than zero.  It will not be willing  to pay much to join the
mechanism,  because even if it receives tde object, its gains from trade will  be negligible. In this sense,
the worst off buyer (with valuation equal to zero) will not pay to join the mechanism.
Similarly,  the worst off seller -the one with valuation equal to one, and hence the least
to gain from trading - will  not be willing  to pay for the use of the mechanism. Thus, since the worst
off agents can't be induced to finance the subsidy,  we cannot be assured, ex ante, of realizing  efficient
trades.
Disiributed Property  Rihts
If cach agent initially owns half the object, then efficiency requires the same ex post
allocation as above.  However now, each will be  willing to pay to join the  incentive compatible
mechanism.  If the valuations are  v,  and  v2 for agents 1 and 2 respectively, then the trading
mechanism is:
v, > vj  X  agent i gets the object and pays  v, ; and agent j gets paid  v. .
The worst off agent now has  v, = 'h . If  v; > %h  , then agent i expects on average to be a buyer and
make a positive profit.  If  v, < %h  , it expects to sell its share of the object, and make a profit also.
If  v, =  'A , it "expects to be  neither".- 53 -
But the worst  off agents still expect to make a profit from the scheme.  For example,
if agent 1 values the object at  ½ , its expected profit is
E(1/-v 2 Iv2 <1/z)  +  E(V2-/2IV2>' 2 )
=  p(V2<%)  ./4  +  ptV 2 >%)  .1x4
-
1k .
1/4  +  t/2 . 1/4  '  .
Similarly  for agent 2.  Thus, the total amount that the worst off agents are willing  to pay to join in
the trading mechanism is  ½h  . The expected value of consumer surplus, on the other hand, is
E(V.V-V2IV>V2)  +  E(v 2 -V1 lv 1(v 2)  =  1/6+1/6  =  1/3
Therefore, ex ante, the worst off agents (and hence any other traders) are willing  to pay more than
enough to finance the allocation mechanism  (since 1/2 >  1/3).Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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